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ABSTRACT 
We compare two different seniority systems in a legislature whose sole task is 
to decide on distributive issues, and which operates under a Baron-Ferejohn 
recognition rule, where recognition probability is based on seniority. In the 
first system, called "initial proposal power", recognition probability for the 
initial proposal is based on seniority, but once the proposal is voted on by the 
legislature, all members have equal recognition probabilities for any 
reconsideration. Under the second system, called "continuing proposal power,'' 
seniority is used to determine proposal power both in the initial consideration 
and in any reconsideration. We find that in the case of seniority systems 
embodying continuing proposal power, there does not exist an equilibrium in 
which incumbents are reelected, and in which legislators would endogenously 
choose to impose a such a seniority system on themselves. This contrasts with 
previous results in which we have shown that there does exist such an 
equilibrium for the case of initial proposal power. The reason for this result is 
that continuing proposal power lowers the value of senior members, since it 
makes them less desirable as coalition partners. 
*This paper was prepared for the conference on Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, 
May 22-25, 1991. The research reported here was funded in part by NSF Grants #SES-9022932 to the 
California Institute of Technology, and #SES-9023056 to the University of Iowa. We are grateful to Ken 
Shepsle for comments on an earlier paper which led to this research. 
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we compare two different systems of legislative seniority. In the 
first, senior legislators are given disproportionate power to make initial proposals, but 
once the proposal is brought before the legislative body, then the senior members lose 
their power. In the second system, senior legislators have disproportionate proposal 
power throughout the legislative session. While it might seem at first glance that the 
latter system would give more power to senior members, we show that in any 
equilibrium that sustains an incumbency effect and a seniority system, that senior 
members actually have less power under the second system than under the first. In fact 
under the second system, they have no more power than the junior members. 
Our analysis takes place in a formal model of the legislative and electoral system 
which is the same as the one which is developed in McKelvey and Riezman [1990]. We 
model the representative process as an l + n player stochastic game, where l is the 
number of legislators, and n is the number of voters, partitioned into l distinct 
legislative districts. The game alternates back and forth between an election and a 
legislative session. The election is modeled as a game (called the Voter Game) in which 
all the voters in each of the l legislative districts vote to determine who will be their 
representative for the next legislative session. In the legislative session the legislators 
first decide whether or not to have a seniority system for the current session and then 
proceed to select a policy. The policy selected is a decision on a distribution of a fixed 
amount of money among the legislative districts. We model the policy making process 
in the legislative session using the approach of Baron and Ferejohn [1989], who consider 
the legislature as a form of a Rubinstein bargaining game: There is a random 
recognition rule, which depends on seniority, which determines the legislator who makes 
a proposal. The legislators then vote, by majority rule, whether to accept or reject the 
proposal. The process continues until the legislature accepts a proposal, at which time 
the legislature adjourns, and new elections are held (i. e., we return to the voter game) 
and the process begins all over again. 
The difference between the two institutions we look at concerns what happens if 
the legislature rejects the proposal once it comes to the floor. Under continuing 
proposal power, in the second and subsequent considerations by the legislative body, the 
seniority system is the same as in the first proposal. Under initial proposal power, the 
seniority system is only in effect for the initial proposal. In the second and all 
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subsequent proposals, all members have equal probability of recognition. 
In our previous work, McKelvey and Riezman [1990], we show that under initial 
proposal power, an equilibrium exists in which the legislature always votes to impose on 
itself a non trivial seniority system. In the proposal stage, the proposer selects a 
minimum winning coalition, retaining �11 for its own district and allocating l to the
districts of the remaining coalition members. Districts that are not part of the winning 
coalition get nothing. This proposal passes and the game proceeds to the voter game. 
Voters always reelect incumbents. The intuition behind the results is that voters, 
understanding the incentives in the legislative session, realize that their representative 
will be disadvantaged if it does not have seniority hence they always choose to reelect 
their representatives. The next three sections draw heavily on McKelvey and Riezman 
[1990]. 
2. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK
Before introducing the model we work with, we develop some general notation 
for stochastic games. Our model will be a special case of such a general model. 
Assume that there is a set N of players, a set X of alternatives, and for each
player i EN, a Von Neumann Morgenstern utility function u;: X -> Iii! over the set of
alternatives. We assume that X contains a null outcome, x0 with u;(x0) = 0 for all
i EN. Let T be a finite set of states. We now define a stochastic game, r ={rt: t ET}
to be a collection of game elements rt= (St, 7rt, 1/}). Here st= IT iEii'l is an n-tuple of
pure strategy sets. Next Kt: st .... ..A1o(T) = t, I TI is a transition function specifying for
each st Est a probability distribution, 7rt(st) on T, which determines for each st Est 
and y ET, the probability Kt(st)(y) of proceeding to game element fY. Finally, if}: st->
X is an outcome function which specifies for each st E st an outcome ,P1( st) E X. V.f e let
S = IT 
tE
ySt be the collection of pure strategy n-tuples, one for each game element. We
write I:f = ..Ab(SlJ, where ..Ab(SlJ is the set of probability disributions over s;, and then
define I:;= IT tEyI:f 
to be the set of stationary strategies for player i. Elements of I: are
written in the form O" = (0"1,0"2, . . . ,O"n) · We also use the abusive notation
0"1(st) = ITiEN°"l(slJ, and O"(s) = ITtE
rt(st) to represent the probability under (J" of
choosing the pure strategy profile st Est, ands ES, respectively.
For stationary strategies, we can define the payoff function M1: �-> !Rn by
111l(o-) = � L 7r�(o-)(r)·u;(1V(o-'}), 
r=l rtT 
where 7r�(o-)(r) is defined inductively by
7rj(o-)(r) = 7rt(o-t)(r) = L o-t(st)·7rt(st)(r), 
s1ESt 
7r¥(o-)(r) = L 7r¥-1(o-)(y)·7r�(o-1)(r),yEY 
and u;( ,P1( o-1)) is defined by
u;(,Pt(o-t)) = L o-t(st)·u;(,Pt(st)). 
s1eS1 
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(2.1) 
Note that the above is only well defined if the sum in (2.1) converges for all o-, t, and i. 
A strategy n-tuple, o- E �is said to be a Nash equilibrium if M;(o-i, O"_;) :<; M;(o-)
for all o-i E �i· It follows from standard results of stochastic games, that any stationary
Nash equilibrium can be characterized by a collection { v1} IE T <;; !Rn of values for each
game element r1, and a strategy profile, o- E � satisfying:
(a) For all t ET, o-1 is a Nash equilibrium to the game with payoff function
G1: �t-> !Rn defined by:
ct(o-t) = u(,Pt(o-t)) + L 7rt(o-t)(y) ·VyyET 
We will use the above result to characterize equilibria in the stochastic game we 
consider. Finally, it also follows from results in Sobel [1971] that a Nash equilibrium in 
the set of stationary strategies is also a Nash equilibrium in the larger class of non­
stationary strategies. 
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3. THE GAME WITH INITIAL PROPOSAL POWER
We consider an infinitely repeated game between legislators and their 
constituents. The game alternates back and forth between a legislative session, m 
which legislators decide on a division of a fixed pie among the legislative districts, and 
an election, in which the voters decide whether or not to reelect their legislators. 
The legislative session consists of three parts: a vote on the seniority structure, a 
proposal by a randomly selected member, and a vote on the proposal. The legislative 
session starts with a vote on the seniority structure. If a majority of the legislators vote 
for a seniority system, it passes, otherwise there is no seniority system. Next, a random 
recognition rule, like that of Baron and Ferejohn [1989] is used to select a legislator as a 
proposer. If no seniority system was passed, all legislators have equal probability of 
being selected. On the other hand, if a seniority system was passed, then the 
probability of recognition is an increasing function of the legislator's relative seniority. 
The proposer proposes a division of the pie among the !., legislative districts. The
legislature then votes on the proposal. If the proposal is defeated, a new proposer is 
selected and the game continues as before. Under continuing proposal power, the next 
proposer is selected in the same manner as in the first round. Under initial proposal 
power, seniority is ignored in selecting the second and all subsequent proposers. Once a 
proposal passes the legislature the legislative session ends. 
After each legislative session there is an election. The voters can choose to re­
elect their incumbent legislator, in which case the legislator has seniority in the next 
session and receives a salary of c, or the voters can vote not to re-elect the incumbent, 
in which case their legislator receives no salary and goes to the next session with no 
seniority. While this is not completely realistic it at least captures the idea that voters 
can punish their representatives if they feel that they are not acting in their best 
interests. Our formulation allows more limited punishments than would be the case if 
voters could remove the legislator from office permanently. After each election the 
legislative session begins again with the new seniority structure. All agents have utility 
functions which are the discounted present value of their lifetime stream of utility. For 
the legislators, in each period, payoffs consist of a salary, which depends on whether 
they are re-relected, and a percentage (1 - e) of what they secure for their disrict.
Thus, they skim some exogenously given portion of their district's payoff. For the 
voters, in each period they get g times their share of what their legislator is able to
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secure for the district. 
We now define the legislative seniority game more formally as a special kind of 
stochastic game. We let the set of players be N = L U V, where L is the set of
legU3lators, with l = / L / 2: 3 odd, and V is the set of voters. We assume that there is a
function </>: V -+ L identifying the legU;lative dU;tricts, such that voter v is in legislator ts
district if <f>(v) = e. We assume that ne = / </>-1(e) / is odd for all e EL. We assume that
the set of outcomes is X = X' U x0, where X' = 6l x {O,1 }1, and x0 is the null outcome.
Elements of X' are written in the form x = (z, q), where z E Z = t;L, and
q E Q = {O, 1 }L. So z = (z 1, ... , z 1) E Z = 6 L represents a division of the resources
between the l districts, and q = (q1, ... , qJ,) E Q = {O, 1 }L repesents the seniority
structure of the legislature, with qi = 1 indicating that legislator i has seniority, whereas
qi= 0 indicating it does not have seniority. We assume that utility functions over X' 
are of the form u;(x) = (1- IJ)zi+ cqi for i EL, and u;(x) = (IJ/nq,(i))zq,(i) for i EV.
Further, for the null outcome, it is assumed that u;(x0) = 0 for all i EN.
Let 0 < 8 < 1 be a fixed discount rate, and q* be the element of Q satisfying
ql = 1 for all i. Let p: Q -+ 6 L be a function which indicates the proposal power of each
legislator as a function of it's seniority. vVe assume p is strictly monotonic in each
component: for all q E Q, and i EL, qi> q£ * Pi(q) > p;(q£, q_;), and that qi= qj * 
p;(q) = pj(q). Thus, more seniority means a higher probability that a legislator is
selected as the proposer, and legislators with the same seniority have equal probability 
of being selected. 
We assume that there are two basic phases of the game, called the Legislative 
Session and the Election, plus an ending state, called the Termination Game. The 
Election consists of a single component, called the Voting Game, but the Legislative 
Session is further divided into four stages, called the Legislative Seniority Game, the 
Legislative Recognition Game, the Legislative Proposal Game, the Legislative Voting 
Game. This yields a total of six basic game elements, represented by the set 
{LS, LR, LP, LV, V, T}. Each of these is further indexed by the current state variable. 
Let 'r = ({LS} x Q) U ({LR} x Q) U ({LP} x Q x L) U ({LV} x Q x Z) U ({V} x Z) U 
( {T}) be the set of states. 
The strategy sets and transition functions for the game elements are defined as 
follows: 
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For t E {LS} x Q, st= { {0,1}' {O} 
if i EL 
if i EN - L, LS: Legislative Seniority Game 
;rt( st)( LR, t 1) = 1
;rt( st)( LR, q*) = 1
1. f � t l i EL s;> 2'
1.f "' t < l L>i ELS; - 2'
The first decision the legislature makes is whether or not to have seniority for 
the current session. This game is indexed by t = (LS, t 1), where t0 =LS indicates that
we are in the Legislative Seniority Game, and t 1 is the current seniority vector. The
vote determines if seniority is used in the Legislative Recognition Game below. If a 
majority of the legislators vote for seniority, then the current seniority vector, t 1, is
used in the Legislative Recognition Game. If there is not a strict majority voting for,
then the seniority vector q*, which assigns equal weight to all legislators, is used in the 
Legislative Recognition Game. 
Fort E {LR} x Q: SJ= {O} if i EN, LR: Legislative Recognition Game 
;rt(st)(LP, t1, y) = Py(t1) if y EL,
,pt( st) = x o for all st E st.
The Legislative Recognition Game is the second stage of the legislative session. 
This game is indexed by t =(LR, t 1), where t0 = LR indicates we are in the Legislative
Recognition Game, and t 1 is the current seniority vector. If seniority passed in the 
Legislative Seniority Game, the seniority vector t 1 is the same as that in the Legislative 
Seniority Game. If seniority failed then q* is used for the seniority vector. A legislator 
is selected by a random recognition rule to make a proposal for consideration by the 
legislature. This rule is similar to the Baron Ferejohn recognition rule, except we let 
the recognition rule be a function of seniority. Assumptions made above guarantee that 
higher seniority leads to higher probability of being selected as the proposer. 
Fort E{LP}xQxL: SJ={ fa} if i = t if i EN - {t}, 
Kt(st)(LV, t1, sl) = 1, 
1f}(st) = xo for all st E St. 
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LP: Legislative Proposal Game 
The Legislative Proposal Game is the third stage of the legislative session. This 
game is indexed by t = (LP, t1, t2), where t0 = LP indicates that we are in the proposal
game, t1 is the current seniority vector, and t2 EL is the legislator who has been
selected to make a proposal. This legislator, who has been selected as the proposer in 
the Legislative Recognition Game, makes a proposal for a division of the dollar between 
the legislative districts. If the legislator proposes the division z, then we proceed to the 
Legislative Voting Game (LV, t1, z) . 
. t -{ {O, 1} if i E L Fort E{LV}xQxZ. S;- {O} ifi EV,
Kt( st)(V, t 2) = 1 if "'E.iEL sl > f,
Kt( st)( LR, q*) = 1 if "'E.iasl :<:: f,
,pt( st)= x0 for all st Est.
L: Legislative Voting Game 
The Legislative Voting Game is the fourth stage of the legislative session. This 
game is indexed by t = (LV, t 1, t2), where t0 = LV indicates that we are in the
Legislative Voting Game, t1 is the current seniority vector, and t2 E Z indicates the
proposal for division of the dollar that was selected by the proposer in the Legislative 
Proposal Game. In this game, the proposal t 2 is before the legislature, and the
legislators must vote whether to accept it or reject it. If the legislators vote to accept 
the proposal, the legislative session ends, and we proceed to the Voter Game. If the
legislators reject the proposal we return to the Legislative Recognition Game, however 
with initial proposal power seniority is ignored in selecting the proposer. Note that the 
Legislative Proposal and Legislative Voting Games together are similar to the closed 
rule version of the Baron Ferejohn model. 
For t E {V} x Z: st= { {O, 1} if i EV' {O} ifiEL,
;rt(st)(LS,q(st)) = 8, 
;rt( st)(T) = 1 - 8, 
'<f}( st) = ( t 1' q( st)),
where q(st) = (q1(st), q2(s1), ... ,q.1,(st)) E Q is defined by
1 
q(st) ={ z 
0
if "' st> ne 
L... JE</>-l(i) J 2 
if"' st<� 
L... jE<f>-J(i) J - 2 '
and where 0 < () < 1 and 0 < c are constants.
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V: Voter Game 
The Voter Game consists of a set of simultaneous elections in all of the 
legislative districts. This game is indexed by t = (V, t 1), where t0 =V indicates that we
are in the Voter Game, and t 1 E Z represents the outcome of the Legislative Voting
Game. In each legislative district, the voters of that district vote whether or not to 
reelect their legislator. In the version of the game as it is presented here, there is only 
one legislator in each district, and no challenger. So the effect of a negative vote in a 
given district is that the legislator from that district does not get a salary for the next 
period, and loses its seniority. 
The Voter Game also determines the termination conditions of the game. With 
probability 8, the game proceeds to the Legislative Seniority Game. With probability
1 - 8 the game proceeds to the Termination Game. This is a formal way of introducing
discounting into the model. It is assumed that there is a probability 1 - 8 of
termination after each round of the game. Note that the entire game terminates when 
this occurs. This is equivalent to assuming that players discount future payoffs by an 
amount 8. The Termination game is an absorbing state with zero payoffs forever:
Fort E {T}: SJ= {O} if i EN,
;rt(s1)(0) = 1, 
,pt( st) = x o for all st E st.
T: Termination Game 
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This completes the description of the stochastic game. Note that there are no 
payoffs except in the Voter Game. At that point policy x = (t1,q(st)) is implemented.
Thus, the pie is divided up among the districts according to z = t 1 E Ll.l, and q(st) E Q
determines which legislators get reelected, and which do not. Given the utility 
functions we have specified, it follows that the output t 1£ to district e is first divided up
with IJt Je actually delivered to the voters, and (1 - IJ)t 1£ being skimmed off by legislator
e. The voters each get an even share of the delivered output. The legislators, in
addition to their share of the output get a salary which is dependent on whether they 
are reelected or not. 
4. EQUILIBRIUM WITH INITIAL PROPOSAL POWER
The following proposition is proven in McKelvey and Riezman [1990]. 
PROPOSITION 1: The following is a stationary equilibrium to the legislative seniority
game defined in section 3. 
Fort E {LS} x Q, and i EL:
Fort E {LP} x Q x L: t 1 '\' 8 O' t = TQ;T L. wEDt zt( w)'
where nt = {w E {O, l}
l:
Dr+IRl is defined by:
l+l I:;w;=-2-, Wt=l}, Dxis the Dirac delta at x, and Zf. 
Fort E {LV}xQxZ, and i EL:
.1.+1 if i = t2r 
zji(w) = { 1 if i '# t, I
0 otherwise. 
{
l if t1> l 
at(l)= 
i-£ 
t 
0 if t Ji< l 
For t E {V} x Z, and i E V: aJ(l) = 1 for all i.
W·= 1 ' 
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The proposition gives equilibrium strategies for both the legislators and voters in 
the game with initial proposal power. In the Legislative Seniority Game all legislators 
with seniority vote in favor of the seniority system, those who do not have seniority 
vote against the seniority system. In this equilibrium, since all legislators get reelected 
the seniority system always passes. 
In the Legislative Proposal Game, the proposer selects a minimal winning 
coalition of legislators which includes itself. The proposer retains \11 for its own
district, leaving i to be allocated to the districts of each of the remaining members of
the coalition. Districts whose legislators are not a part of the winning coalition are 
allocated zero. Thus the proposer obtains a premium of \11 - ± =.l',21, 1 due to its
proposal power. As L-•oo this premium goes to one half.
In the Legislative Voting Game, a legislator votes for a proposal if and only if it 
receives at least t· Thus, in equilbrium all proposals receive .I',! 1 votes and pass.
Finally, in the Voter Game, the voters always vote to reelect their legislators. It 
should be noted that although the proof shows only that this is a Nash equilibrium for 
the voters, in fact the strategy of voting for the incumbent is a dominant strategy for 
the voters in any given legislative district. 
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward: Voters know that in
equilibrium the seniority system will pass, hence it is in their best interest to reelect the 
incumbent, since a senior legislator will be more easily able to serve the constituency 
than a junior legislator. Note that voters do not know that there will be a seniority 
system in the next session, but rather know that in the steady state equilibrium, 
seniority will be voted in each session. In the next section we show that the results 
change if legislatures use continuing proposal power rather than initial proposal power. 
5. EQUILIBRIUM WITH CONTINUING PROPOSAL POWER
In the above model the seniority system works through the Legislative Proposal 
stage, by influencing the probability that legislators get chosen to be the proposer. We 
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assumed that seniority only is used for selecting the proposer in the first round of any 
legislative session. So, if a proposal is turned down in the legislature, then seniority is 
no longer used to select the proposer during that legislative session. The alternative we 
now analyze is the case in which seniority is in effect throughout the legislative session. 
One might think that this system, which on its face gives more power to the senior 
members, would make them better off, and hence would be selected by them. However, 
we show that the opposite is the case. When seniority is in effect for the entire session 
the only equilibrium is one in which legislators with and without seniority have the 
same continuation values. In other words, any equilibria have the property that 
seniority has no benefits for legislators. So, legislators would be indifferent between 
having and not having such a seniority system and would hence prefer a seniority 
system in which seniority is used for only the first proposal in each legislative session. 
Thus we get the rather paradoxical result that legislators who have seniority would 
choose a seniority system which on its face gives more less power to senior members. 
It is worth pointing out that a seniority system which gives only initial proposal 
power is a realistic description of the seniority system for the U.S. Congress in the sense 
that seniority is embodied in the committee system. The committees make proposals 
by sending bills to the Floor. Once the bills go to the Floor the committees lose most of 
their power since bills that are amended or defeated generally do not go back to 
committe in that session. Hence our model might explain certain features about the 
way in which seniority systems are set up - in particular the importance of initial 
proposal power. 
We now turn to consideration of the Legislative Voting Game when seniority is 
used for selection of the proposer in every round. The rest of the stochastic game is as 
before. We change the Legislative Voting Game so that when a proposal is rejected the 
subsequent Legislative Recognition Game will use the original seniority vector. In other 
words, the Legislative Voting Game is 
F t E {LV'} Q z. gt= { {O, 1} if i ELor x x · ' {O} if i EV, LV':Revised Legislative Voting Game 
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Consider the stochastic game of section 3, substituting the above game for the previous 
Legislative Voting Game. Call this the Revised Game. 
PROPOSITION 2: In the Revised Game there is no symmetric stationary equilibrium 
with the following two properties: 
(1) Voters always reelect incumbents: 
For t E {V} x Z and i EV, <7J(l) = 1. 
(2) The value of senior and non-senior members in the Legislative Seniority Game
is different. 
Proof Let vfR,q be the value to i E L in the Legislative Recognition Game, given
seniority vector q E Q. Assume, without loss of generality that
VLR,q < v LR,q < < vLR,q1 - 2 . . .  - ./, 
Let K be the largest integer for which vfR,q = vf(R,q We will first show that either
K = .t, or the legislators vote against seniority in the Legislative Seniority Game. We
deal first with the case when pure strategies are adopted in the Legislative Proposal 
Game, and then discuss the case of mixed strategies. So assume that K < L There are
2 cases: 
Case 1: f{ :S .l,zl· 
First, write vi = vfR, q*. By assumptions 1 and 2 of the theorem, and using
symmetry, it follows that vi= vj for all i f j. So write v* = vi- Now since legislators
adopt an undominated Nash equilibrium in the Revised Legislative Voting Game, it 
follows that legislator i will vote for t2 (i.e. sJ = 1) if vj't2 2: vfR'11. But by
Assumptions 1 and 2, writing z = t2,
v;,z = vj'12 = (1- il)z; + c + ov*,
and 
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Hence sj = 1 if 
(1 -B)zi + c + 8v* ?'.: vfR,q_ 
It follows that in the Legislative Proposal game, Nash equilibrium implies t2 = j will 
choose zj to maximize zj subject to zj being approved by a majority in the Legislative
voting game. Hence voter j will select a coalition C j � L - {j} of size .£,2 l for which
I; vf R, q is minimized, and setiEC. 
3 zj= -1-(vLR,q_c-8v*)foriEC· (1) ' 1- e ' J' 
zj = 1 - I; z{, andiEC · 
• J z{= O forif:Cj, ifj. 
Since vLR, q is minimal and I {i E L· vLR, q = vLR, q} I < .£, - 1 it follows that for all 1 , . ' 1 -2-
j f 1, 
Or, 
But 
where 
So 
j _ 1 ( LR, q c *) _ Zl - (1- e) Vl - C -UV - Zl. 
(1 - B)z{ + c + 8v* = vfR,q_ 
vfR,q = I;pi(q)vf P,q,i,i<L 
vfP,q,i = vfV,q,z' = (1-B)zi +c+8v*.
(1 -l:i)z{ + c + 8v* = I:Pi(q)[(l -i:i)zl + c + 8v*]icL 
=? (1 - l:i)z{ = (1- 1:1) I: P;(q)ziiEL 
=? z{ = P1(q)zy + (1-p1(q))z{ 
But we have shown that zi = Zf for all i E L, hence
vfR,q = I; Pi( q)vf P, q, i = I; Pi( q)[(l -l:i)zl + c + 8v*] = (1 - l:i)zy + c + 8v*.icL icL 
Further, from equation (1) above, it follows that for all j E C1,
vjR, q = (1 -11)z} + c +/:iv*.
Hence, setting C = C 1 U {1 } ,
But 
?:: vJR, q = .L [(1 - 11)z} + c +/:iv*] = (1 - 11) + J.. t 1( c +/:iv*).
J<C JEC 
L:vLR,q= L 2.:P·(q)vLP,q,i= L 2.:p-(q)[(l-11)zi.+c+l:iv*] 
.LJ ·L·L' J "L"L' J Jf Jf 'lf. Jf 'lf 
= 2.:P;(q) 2.: [(1-11)z� + c +/:iv*]= 2.:P;(q)[(l - 11) + i.(c +/:iv*)] � �L id 
= (1 - 11) + i.( c + /:iv*) 
Combining the last two equations, it follows that 
L vLR, q = [ .£. - J.. + 1 ]( c +/:iv*) = J.. - 1( c + /:iv*).
·L 01 2 2 
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Since we also have that for each j EL, vjR,q ::'.': c +/:iv*, it follows from the above, that
for all j EL- C, vyR,q = c +/:iv*. But since i. r/: C, and for some j EC we must have
z} > 0, it follows that vfR,q < vJR,q, a contradiction.
Case 2: J.. 2 1 < J{ < L 
In this case, in the Legislative Seniority Game, it follows that individual i will
only vote for seniority (i. e., sj = 1) if vfR,q ::'.': v*, where, as in Case 1, v* =vi= vfR,q*
for all i EL. By the same argument as in Case 1,
i.v*= L:v�= L:vLR,q* =(1-11)+.t(c+l:iv*).
j<L J j<L J 
(2) 
So 
v* = f(l - 11) + ( c +/:iv*). 
Now, it must be the case that vfR,q < v*. To see this, assume that vfR,q ::'.': v*. Then
using vfR,q ::; v/R,q for all j EL, and vfR,q < v/R,q for j > K, it follows that
L:vLR,q* > L:v* = i.v*,. L J . L l JE JE 
which contradicts (2). But now since vjR,q = vfR,q for all j::; K, it follows that for all
j::; K, vJR,q < v*. It follows that in the Legislative Seniority Game, sj = 1 for all
15 
i :S K. But by assumption, ./., 21 < K. Or, equivalently, ./., t 1 :SK. Thus a majority
vote against seniority in the Legislative Seniority Game. 
We have thus shown that either K = 1., or a majority vote against seniority in
the Legislative Seniority Game. But now if a majority vote against seniority in the 
Legislative Seniority Game, it follows that vfS,q = vfR,q* = v* for all i EL. On the
other hand, if J{ = 1., it follows that vfR, q = vjR, q for all i, j E L. So regardless of the
vote in the Legislative Seniority Game, we have vf5' q = vf5' q for all i, j E L. Hence, in
both cases, we have shown that vf5' q = vj5' q for all i, j E L, which violates assumption
(2) of the proposition.
The above argument has assumed that pure strategies are adopted in the 
Legislative Proposal Game. However, if mixed strategies are adopted, then any mixed 
strategy for legislator j must mix between pure strategies each of which satisfies the 
condition that j will select a coalition C j � L - {j} of size ./.,:/ for which . I: vfR, q IS 
minimized. Thus the same argument as above can be applied. 
icC j 
Q. E. D. 
The intuition behind this result has to do with how proposers choose coalition partners. 
Once chosen, proposers want to include in the coalition those with the lowest 
continuation values because they can be given less and will still vote for the proposal. 
It follows then, when seniority is used throughout the legislative session, if seniority 
benefits senior members then they will be less likely to be included in coalitions. What 
Proposition 2 shows is that for senior members the effect of being included in coalitions
less often swamps the advantage of being chosen as proposer more often when seniority 
is used throughout the session. Thus, once the proposer is chosen senior members want 
to look like non-senior members so they are as likely to be included in the coalition. 
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